The security scan of mikrotik.com found 10 medium and low severity issues. No critical vulnerabilities were detected, but 1 issues should be addressed this week to harden your security posture. Detailed fix instructions are included for each finding.
CSP script-src allows 'unsafe-inline', 'unsafe-eval' โ an injected or hijacked script can still run freely
This setting defeats most of the protection CSP is meant to provide. If a third-party script you rely on is ever compromised โ the exact mechanism behind most 'watering hole' attacks โ it will execute without restriction and with no warning.
Example: A vendor's analytics or chat-widget script gets compromised at the source; because the policy still allows it (or allows inline/eval scripts generally), the malicious code runs exactly as if it belonged on the site, with no warning to anyone.
Tighten script-src to an explicit allowlist of trusted domains and drop 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval'/wildcards. Move inline scripts to external files or use a nonce/hash. Test changes with https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com before deploying.
CWE-693 โ Protection Mechanism Failure
A security safeguard that should be protecting the system is missing, disabled, or not strong enough.
Missing X-Content-Type-Options โ browsers may guess file types incorrectly, which can enable content injection
This is a minor gap on its own, but it slightly raises the odds that a malicious file could be misread as something else by a visitor's browser, helping a separate attack succeed.
Example: A user-uploaded file intended to be harmless (like an image) is reinterpreted by the browser as executable script because the server never told it what the file actually was, letting an unrelated vulnerability turn into a working attack.
Add: 'add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;' (Nginx) or 'Header always set X-Content-Type-Options nosniff' (Apache). This is a one-line fix that takes 2 minutes.
CWE-693 โ Protection Mechanism Failure
A security safeguard that should be protecting the system is missing, disabled, or not strong enough.
Missing Referrer-Policy โ page URLs (which may include sensitive data) are shared with third-party sites your pages link to
If any of your page addresses contain sensitive details (like a password-reset token or account ID), that information could leak to outside sites your pages link to โ a small but easily avoidable privacy gap.
Example: A customer clicks an outbound link from a page whose URL happens to include an account ID or a password-reset token, and that full address โ token included โ is handed to the destination site in the Referer header.
Add: 'add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;' (Nginx) or 'Header always set Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin' (Apache).
CWE-16 โ Configuration
The weakness comes from how the software was configured, not from a flaw in its code.
Missing Permissions-Policy โ browser features like camera, microphone, and location aren't restricted for embedded third-party scripts
If you ever embed third-party ads, widgets, or analytics scripts, they could request a visitor's camera, microphone, or location without you intending to allow it โ an avoidable privacy risk for your customers.
Example: An embedded ad network's script requests the visitor's location or microphone access through a permission prompt the site owner never intended to allow, simply because nothing in the page's headers restricted it.
Add: 'add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()" always;' Adjust based on what your site actually uses. This limits what ad/analytics scripts can access.
CWE-693 โ Protection Mechanism Failure
A security safeguard that should be protecting the system is missing, disabled, or not strong enough.
Public IP 159.148.172.205 (hosted by MIKROTIKLS SIA) has no abuse reports on AbuseIPDB in the last 90 days.
A clean IP reputation is a good sign โ no other indication needed here.
No action required.
Public IP 159.148.172.205 is registered to LATNET-MNT (LV) โ network: MIKROTIKLSSIA โ block: 159.148.172.128 โ 159.148.172.255.
This is informational โ it tells you (and anyone else who looks it up) which hosting provider or network actually operates this IP. Useful for confirming you're hosted where you expect, or for context if the IP reputation check above flags anything.
No action required โ this is identifying information, not a vulnerability.
DMARC is already enforcing, so this domain qualifies for BIMI โ a verified logo shown next to emails in Gmail, Yahoo, and Apple Mail โ but no BIMI record is set up
This isn't a vulnerability โ it's a missed brand-trust opportunity. Since DMARC is already enforcing (a prerequisite most mailbox providers require), this domain could show a verified logo next to its emails in supporting inboxes, which can measurably improve open rates and make phishing look more out of place by comparison.
Example: two otherwise-identical marketing emails land in a Gmail inbox โ one from a sender with BIMI configured shows a verified brand logo next to it, the other shows a generic default icon indistinguishable from a spoofed sender.
Add a TXT record for 'default._bimi' with a value pointing to a hosted SVG logo, e.g. 'v=BIMI1; l=https://yourdomain.com/logo.svg'. Some mailbox providers (notably Gmail) also require a Verified Mark Certificate (VMC) โ a paid trademark-backed certificate โ before they'll display the logo; Apple Mail and Yahoo currently do not require one. This is optional and lower-priority than any HIGH/MEDIUM finding above.
/.well-known/security.txt returned HTTP 200, a real distinct response rather than the site's soft-404 page. This path isn't one a typical visitor would stumble onto by browsing the site normally, which is why it's worth a quick manual look โ but its existence alone isn't a vulnerability.
/.well-known/security.txt returned HTTP 200, a real distinct response rather than the site's soft-404 page. This path isn't one a typical visitor would stumble onto by browsing the site normally, which is why it's worth a quick manual look โ but its existence alone isn't a vulnerability.
Open the path yourself and confirm it's meant to be public. If it's leftover debug/test/admin tooling that should have been removed, take it down or restrict it by IP allowlist. If it's intentional, no action needed.
/sitemap.xml is present and was used to seed additional path checks.
/sitemap.xml is present and was used to seed additional path checks.
No action needed โ sitemap.xml is meant to be public.
/robots.txt is present and was used to seed additional path checks.
/robots.txt is present and was used to seed additional path checks.
No action needed โ robots.txt is meant to be public.
No high-risk open ports were detected from the internet โ your firewall appears to be blocking dangerous services.